Before Russia invaded mainland Ukraine on 24 February 2023, many predicted that full-scale conflict would be averted. When the attack began, Russian President Vladimir Putin himself expected a 10-day war, according to think tank RUSI.1 15 May 2024 marks two years, two months and three weeks of fighting, with no end in sight.
Ukrcement, the Ukrainian cement association, recently published its cement market data for 2023, the first full year of the war. The data showed domestic cement consumption of 5.4Mt, up by 17% year-on-year from 4.6Mt in 2022, but down by 49% from pre-war levels of 10.6Mt in 2021. In 2023, Ukraine’s 14.8Mt/yr production capacity was 2.7 times greater than its consumption, compared to 1.4 times in 2021. Of Ukraine’s nine cement plants, one (the 1.8Mt/yr Amwrossijiwka plant in Donetsk Oblast) now lies behind Russian lines. Four others sit within 300km of the front line in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Among these, the 4.4Mt/yr Balakliia plant in Kharkiv Oblast, the largest in the country, first fell to the Russians, but was subsequently liberated in September 2022.
Before the war, Ukrcement’s members held a 95% share in the local cement market. Their only competitors were Turkish cement exporters across the Black Sea, after the Ukrainian Interdepartmental Commission on International Trade successfully implemented anti-dumping duties against cement from Moldova and now-sanctioned Belarus and Russia in 2019. Since then, Turkish cement, has also become subject to tariffs of 33 – 51% upon entry into Ukraine until September 2026. The relative shortfall in consumption has led Ukraine’s cement producers to lean on their own export markets. They increased their exports by 33% year-on-year to 1.24Mt in 2023, 330,000t (27%) of it to neighbouring Poland.
Russia’s invasion has made 3.5m Ukrainians homeless and put the homes of 2.4m more in need of repair. In a report published in Ukrainian, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) set out its three-year rebuilding plan for the country. USAID projects an investment cost of €451bn, with the ‘main task’ besides homebuilding being to increase the share of industrial production in the economy. Ukraine is 90% equipped to produce all building materials required under the plan. Their production, in turn, will create or maintain 100,000 jobs and US$6.5bn in tax revenues. Reconstruction will also involve the Ukrainian cement industry returning to close to full capacity utilisation, producing 15 – 16Mt/yr of cement.
CRH, an established local player of 25 years, looks best set to claim a share of the proceeds. Stepping down an order of magnitude from billions to millions, Global Cement recently reported CRH’s total investments in Ukraine to date as €465m. Since war broke out, the company has more than tripled its rate of investment, to €74.5m. The Ireland-based group is in the protracted administrative process of acquiring the Ukrainian business of Italy-based Buzzi. If successful, the deal will raise its Ukrainian capacity by 56%, to 8.4Mt/yr – 57% of national capacity. This unusual clumping of ownership may be made possible by the participation of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in partly acquiring the assets, as per a mandate letter signed with CRH in 2023.
Leading Ukrainian cement buyer Kovalska Industrial-Construction Group bemoaned the anticipated increase in market concentration. On the one hand, this sounds like a classic tiff between cement producers and users with shallow pockets. On the other hand, an antebellum allegation of cement industry cartelisation should give us pause for thought. Non-governmental organisation The Antitrust League previously reported Ukraine’s four cement producers to the government’s Anti-Monopoly Committee for alleged anticompetitive behavior. This was in September 2021, when Ukraine was barely out of lockdown, let alone up in arms. With all that has happened since, it may seem almost ancient history, yet the players are the same, CRH and Buzzi among them.
Ukrcement and its members have secured favourable protections from the Trade Commission, and, for whatever reasons, evaded the inconvenience of investigation by the Anti-Monopoly Committee – a state of affairs over which the Antitrust League called the committee ‘very weak.’ The league says that producers previously raised prices by 35 – 50% in the three years up to 2021. In planning a fair and equitable reconstruction, Ukrainians might reasonably seek assurance that this will not happen again.
All these discussions are subject to a time-based uncertainty: the end of the war in Ukraine. A second question is where the finances might come from. The EU approved funding for €17bn in grants and €33bn in loans for Ukraine on 14 May 2024. Meanwhile, countries including the UK have enacted legislation to ensure Russia settles the cost of the conflict at war’s end. If Ukraine achieves its military aims, then the finances may flow from the same direction as did the armaments that demolished Ukrainian infrastructure in the first place.
The first piece of Ukraine annexed by Russia was Crimea in February 2014, making the invasion over a decade old. Against such a weight of tragedy, the country cannot lose sight of the coming restoration work, and of the need to ensure that it best serve Ukrainians.
